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Dissipativity Tools for Convergence to Nash Equilibria in Population
Games
Murat Arcak1 and Nuno C. Martins2
Abstract—We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical
model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among
the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects
one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly according to a
protocol that typically prioritizes strategies whose payoffs are
either higher than that of the current strategy or exceed the
population average. The model is predicated on well-established
research in population and evolutionary games, and has two sub-
components. The first is the payoff dynamics model (PDM), which
ascribes the payoff to each strategy according to the proportions
of every population adopting the available strategies. The second
sub-component is the evolutionary dynamics model (EDM) that
accounts for the revision process. In our model, the social state
at equilibrium is a best response to the payoff, and can be
viewed as a Nash-like solution that has predictive value when it
is globally asymptotically stable (GAS). We present a systematic
methodology that ascertains GAS by checking separately whether
the EDM and PDM satisfy appropriately defined system-theoretic
dissipativity properties. Our work generalizes pioneering meth-
ods based on notions of contractivity applicable to memoryless
PDMs, and more general system-theoretic passivity conditions. As
demonstrated with examples, the added flexibility afforded by our
approach is particularly useful when the contraction properties
of the PDM are unequal across populations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a large number of agents that interact by selecting
strategies in a noncooperative way. Each agent selects one
strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly in response to a
payoff vector whose entries are the rewards of all strategies.
The revision process is governed by a protocol that, in general,
is probabilistic and prioritizes strategies with a higher payoff.
Each agent belongs to one of a finite collection of populations,
and agents in the same population choose strategies from
a common finite set, follow an identical revision protocol,
and access the same payoff vector. Although each population
is protocol-homogenous, its agents are allowed to simulta-
neously adopt distinct strategies. The state of a population
is a vector whose entries are proportional to the number of
agents adopting each strategy. By concatenating the states
of all populations, we generate the so-called social state. A
causal payoff mechanism determines the payoff vectors of the
populations in terms of the social state. Hence, although the
agents are noncooperative, their decisions are coupled through
the payoff mechanism.
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A. Main Contributions and Comparison To Previous Work
In this article, we generalize previous results characterizing
the convergence of the social state towards an appropriately
defined Nash-like equilibrium set of the payoff mechanism.
Stability is a critical property because it ensures that the
equilibrium is a predictor of the long term behavior of the
social state.
For relevant classes of revision protocols, seminal work
in [1] put forth a Lyapunov-based approach to establish the
global asymptotic stability (GAS) of the set of Nash equilibria
when the payoff possesses a contraction property1. The results
in [1] indicate that contractive population games will reach
Nash equilibria under broad classes of revision protocols.
By using system-theoretic passivity concepts, as originally
introduced in this context in [4], subsequent work in [3],
[5], [6] proposed a methodology that generalizes the stability
results in [1] for dynamical payoff mechanisms. As illustrated
in [5, Section V.B (Fig.5)], the Nash equilibria of a contractive
game that is GAS for a given revision protocol may become
unstable when first order smoothing dynamics is included in
the payoff mechanism.
In this paper we present dissipativity tools that further
extend the passivity properties used in [4], [3], [5], [6], and
allow us to establish GAS of the set of Nash equilibria for
broader classes of dynamics. These classes include weighted-
contractive games where the payoff mechanism promotes
contraction of the social state dynamics in a way that differs
from one population to another. An example of this class is
the game of congestion with mixed autonomy [7], [8], whose
stability properties have not been established previously. In
addition we explore the flexibility afforded by our method
to characterize the stability of the Nash equilibria when the
payoff mechanism is either static or a dynamic modification
that smooths short-term fluctuations and isolates longer term
trends. We also propose a numerical method that leverages
convex optimization to determine whether a game satisfies
the relaxed contraction properties that are consistent with the
generalized dissipativity properties set forth in this paper.
B. Deterministic Models: A Brief Discussion
We adopt the deterministic continuous time dynamics model
described in [5], [6], which focuses on the mean closed
loop model depicted in Fig. 1. It consists of the feedback
interconnection of two nonlinear sub-systems: the first is an
1Although population games satisfying this property were originally called
stable in [1], we refer to them as contractive following the nomenclature in [2].
This convention is appropriate because, as illustrated by [1, Example 6.1],
contractive games may still lead to cycles that exclude Nash equilibria for
certain protocols. Furthermore, [3, Section V.B (Fig.1(a))] demonstrates that
contractivity is also not necessary for GAS of the Nash equilibria.
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Fig. 1. Diagram representing a feedback interconnection between a PDM and
an EDM. The resulting system is referred to as mean closed loop model.
evolutionary dynamics model (EDM) that models the effect
of the revision protocols, and the second is a payoff dynamics
model (PDM) that specifies the payoff mechanism. The state
of the EDM and the PDM are the so-called mean social state
and deterministic payoff, respectively, that approximate the
social state and the payoff when the number of agents tends
to infinity as described in [5], [6]. Our model assumes that the
protocols satisfy the so-called Nash stationary property, which
ensures that the mean social state components of the closed
loop equilibria coincide with the Nash-like equilibria of the
PDM. As is discussed in detail in [6, Section V], the analyses
in [9] and [10, Appendix 12.B] indicate that the convergence
of the social state towards Nash-like equilibria, in the limit
of large populations, can be established by doing so for the
mean social state. For these reasons, in this article we study
the mean closed loop model and leverage dissipativity theory
to determine conditions under which the equilibrium set is
globally asymptotically stable.
The deterministic approach adopted here builds on the
extensive body of work on population games and evolutionary
games thoroughly discussed in [10], [11]. Application of this
approach have been reported in the areas of transportation [12],
wireless networks [13], [14], [15], optimization [16], control
systems [17], regulation of heating in buildings [18], and smart
grid [19], [20]. The analysis in [4] introduced the concept
of dynamic payoff mechanisms in this context, and it also
pioneered the use of system-theoretic passivity techniques to
characterize stability properties.
C. Outline of the Paper
Section II considers the case where the payoff is memory-
less and defines the basic components of the model. Section
III introduces the concept of δ-disipativity, which is then used
in Theorem 1 to specify sufficient conditions for stability. Sec-
tion IV introduces the notion of weighted-contractive games,
and shows that these satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1. It
also proves that a congestion game with mixed autonomy [7],
[8] used throughout the article as an example is weighted-
contractive. Section V proposes a numerical method that
leverages convex optimization to determine whether the payoff
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1. As an illustration we
check contraction for a game that captures bypassing near a
road split [21]. Section VI extends the concepts introduced
in Section II to the case in which a payoff dynamics model
(PDM) governs the payoff mechanism. Theorem 2 of Sec-
tion VI replaces Theorem 1 of Section II when the payoff
mechanism is a PDM instead of being memoryless. Section VI
ends by using Theorem 2 to characterize stability for the
congestion game with mixed autonomy modified so as to
include smoothing dynamics.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
We start by describing concepts used throughout the paper,
and defining the elements of the closed loop model. In this
section we assume the payoff mechanism is memoryless and
specified by a population game. In Section VI, we extend these
results to the case in which the payoff mechanism is a more
general PDM specified by a nonlinear dynamical system.
We consider ρ populations labeled {1, . . . , ρ} and denote
the mean state of the rth population at time t as xr(t) ∈ Xr.
Here, Xr is the set of all possible states of population r, also
commonly called strategy profiles, defined as:
X
r := {ξ ∈ Rn
r
≥0 :
nr∑
i=1
ξi = m
r},
where mr is a positive constant representing the total “mass”
of the population. The set of strategies available to popula-
tion r is {1, . . . , nr} and xri (t) is the mean portion of the
population adopting the ith strategy at time t. We define
n := n1 + · · · + nρ and let the n-vector x(t) represent the
mean social state obtained as the concatenation of the vectors
x1(t), . . . , xρ(t). The set X of all possible social states is
defined as:
X := X1 × · · ·Xρ
When the time argument is dropped, xr and x represent a
specific state for population r and a specific social state,
respectively.
Definition 1. (Memoryless payoff mechanism) Given a con-
tinuously differentiable map F : X→ Rn, the corresponding
memoryless payoff mechanism, or population game, generates
the payoff vector as follows:
p(t) = F
(
x(t)
)
, t ≥ 0. (1)
Recall that x¯ is a Nash equilibrium if the following holds:
vTF (x¯) ≤ x¯TF (x¯), v ∈ X. (2)
We use NE(F ) to denote the set of Nash equilibria of F .
Definition 2. (EDM) We associate with each population,
say r, a Lipschitz continuous map νr : Xr × Rn
r
→ Rn
r
that
specifies its evolutionary dynamics model (EDM) as follows:
x˙r(t) = νr(xr(t), pr(t)), t ≥ 0 (3)
3where pr(t) ∈ Rn
r
is the rth conformal partition of p(t) and
the combined vector x(t) ∈ X evolves according to
x˙(t) = ν(x(t), p(t)), where ν(x, p) :=


ν1(x1, p1)
...
νρ(xρ, pρ)

 . (4)
We assume that ν is such that x(t), the solution of the initial
problem (4) at time t, remains in X when x(0) is in X.
Remark 1. (EDM and deterministic evolutionary dynam-
ics) As discussed in [6], our definition of EDM is closely
related to the concept of deterministic evolutionary dynamics
described in [10] specifically for memoryless payoff mecha-
nisms of the form (1). In contrast to our approach in which
we view the EDM (4) as a dynamical system whose input is p
and the output is x, the deterministic evolutionary dynamics is
defined in [10, Section 4.4] as a set-valued map that assigns
to each F a set of mean social state trajectories —typically
obtained as the solution of the initial value problem applied
to the so-called mean dynamics derived in [10, Section 4.2.1].
The importance of the EDM concept for our approach is
twofold: (i) it enables the analysis of the case where the payoff
mechanism has internal dynamics specified by a PDM; (ii) it
allows us to break apart the stability analysis into separate
steps for establishing dissipativity properties for the EDM and
the PDM, thus enabling a modular approach.
The method described in [10, Section 4.2.1] to obtain the
mean dynamics for a given revision protocol can be used
with minor changes to determine ν in (4). For instance, [10,
Example 4.3.5] can be adapted to obtain the Smith EDM
specified by νSmith given below for the rth population:
ν
Smith,r
i (x
r , pr) :=
nr∑
j=1
xrj
[
pri − p
r
j
]
+
− xri
[
prj − p
r
i
]
+
(5)
where [s]+ = s when s ≥ 0, and [s]+ = 0 when s < 0.
The Smith EDM, which is of particular interest to Exam-
ple IV-A (to be discussed later on), is based on the revision
protocol used in [12] for traffic assignment strategies. As one
can infer from (5), the rate at which the agents in population
r switch from strategy i to j is proportional to
[
prj − p
r
i
]
+
.
The following so-called impartial pairwise comparison (IPC)
EDM is a generalization of Smith’s:
ν
IPC,r
i (x
r, pr) :=
nr∑
j=1
xrjφ
r
i
(
pri − p
r
j
)
− xriφ
r
j
(
prj − p
r
i
)
(6)
where, for each j in {1, . . . , nr}, φrj : R→ R≥0 is a Lipschitz
continuous function for which φrj(p˜) > 0 if p˜ > 0 and φ
r
j(p˜) =
0 otherwise.
Definition 3. (Nash Stationarity) We say that an EDM
described as in (4) has the “Nash stationarity” property if
the following equivalence holds:
ν(x, p) = 0 ⇔
[
vT p ≤ xT p, v ∈ X
]
. (7)
This condition ensures that the rest points for (4) with
p = F (x) are Nash equilibria since, by (7), x = x¯ satisfies
ν(x, p) = 0 and p = F (x) if and only if (2) holds. Note that
(7) means that, for each r ∈ {1, . . . , ρ}, the following holds:
νr(xr , pr) = 0 ⇔
[
ωT pr ≤ ωTxr , ω ∈ Xr
]
. (8)
Thus, Nash stationarity of the multi-population EDM (4) is
equivalent to Nash stationarity for the EDM (3) of each
population.
Remark 2. (IPC EDM satisfies (7)) Examples of EDM satis-
fying Nash stationarity include those of the IPC type. Although
in this article we frequently refer to the IPC class, there are
other2 important EDM classes that are Nash stationary, such
as the so-called excess payoff target protocol (EPT) EDM. In
fact, as we will mention in remarks throughout this article,
certain sub-classes of the EPT EDM class have some of the
useful properties of the IPC EDM class.
III. δ-DISSIPATIVITY AND A STABILITY THEOREM
We now introduce the δ-dissipativity property of an EDM,
which can be viewed as a generalization of the notion of δ-
passivity proposed in [4] and subsequently used in [3], [5],
[6] to characterize the stability of Nash-like equilibria for the
mean closed loop.
Definition 4. (δ-Dissipativity w.s.r. Π) An EDM specified by
ν is δ-dissipative with supply rate (w.s.r.) characterized by
Π = ΠT ∈ R2n×2n if there exist a continuously differen-
tiable storage function S : X× Rn → R≥0 and a nonnegative-
valued function σ : X× Rn → R≥0 that satisfy the following
inequality for all x, p and u in X, Rn and Rn, respectively:
∂S(x, p)
∂x
ν(x, p) +
∂S(x, p)
∂p
u (9a)
≤ −σ(x, p) +
[
u
ν(x, p)
]T
Π
[
u
ν(x, p)
]
,
where S and σ must also satisfy the equivalences below:
σ(x, p) = 0 ⇔ ν(x, p) = 0 (9b)
S(x, p) = 0 ⇔ ν(x, p) = 0. (9c)
Remark 3. (When δ-dissipativity implies δ-passivity) If
the n × n block-partitions of Π are Π11 = 0, Π22 = 0
and Π12 = Π12 =
1
2I , then the inequality in (9a) with
u = p˙ implies δ-passivity, as defined in [4, (27)]. The
approach in [5], [6] requires that the storage function is
also “informative” in an appropriately defined sense. Our
additional requirements (9b)-(9c) play a similar role. In fact,
one can show for the aforementioned choice of Π that δ-
dissipativity implies both that the EDM is δ-passive and that
it has an informative storage function, but the opposite does
not hold because informativeness of the storage function does
not imply (9b)-(9c). The reason for this discrepancy is that
our results establish global asymptotic stability, while [5], [6]
also allow weaker notions of stability.
2See [10, Chapter 5] for more details.
4The following remark describes important EDM classes that
are δ-dissipative.
Remark 4. (δ-dissipativity of IPC EDM) As pointed out in
Remark 2, an EDM of the IPC type satisfies Nash stationarity.
It is also δ-dissipative w.s.r. Π as chosen in Remark 3 with
the following storage function S IPC and associated σIPC :
S IPC(x, p) :=
ρ∑
r=1
S IPC,r(xr , pr), (10a)
σIPC(x, p) :=
ρ∑
r=1
σIPC,r(xr , pr), (10b)
where for each population r:
S IPC,r(xr , pr) :=
nr∑
i=1
nr∑
j=1
xri
∫ prj−pri
0
φrj(p˜)dp˜ (11a)
σIPC,r(xr , pr) := −
nr∑
i=1
ν
IPC,r
i (x
r , pr)
nr∑
j=1
∫ prj−pri
0
φrj(p˜)dp˜.
(11b)
As discussed in [4], the argument in [1, Appendix A.4] can be
used here to show that σIPC is nonnegative and satisfies (9b)-
(9c). We can also invoke an immediate analogy of this analysis,
after appropriately modifying the arguments used to prove [1,
Theorem 5.1] and [4, Theorem 4.4], to claim that the so-called
separable EPT EDM class is also δ-dissipative w.s.r. Π, for
the choice of Π in Remark 3.
A. Stability of NE(F ) for memoryless payoff mechanisms
We now investigate the stability of NE(F ) when the payoff
p accessed by the EDM is obtained from the memoryless
map (1), leading to the following system:
x˙(t) = ν
(
x(t), F
(
x(t)
))
, t ≥ 0. (12)
Theorem 1. Suppose that the EDM (4) is Nash stationary and
δ-dissipative w.s.r. Π, for a pre-selected Π. If F satisfies the
following inequality for all x in X then NE(F ) is a globally
asymptotically stable set of (12):[
∂F (x)
∂x
I
]T
Π
[
∂F (x)
∂x
I
]
≤ 0. (13)
Proof. We show that V (x) = S(x, F (x)) serves as a Lya-
punov function and guarantees global asymptotic stability of
NE(F ). V (x) is nonnegative for all x ∈ X and, by (9c) and
(7), it vanishes only when x ∈ NE(F ). Next, note that
∂V (x)
∂x
ν(x, F (x))
=
{
∂S(x, p)
∂x
ν(x, p)+
∂S(x, p)
∂p
∂F (x)
∂x
ν(x, p)
}∣∣∣∣
p=F (x)
≤ −σ(x, F (x)) +{[
u
ν(x, p)
]T
Π
[
u
ν(x, p)
]}∣∣∣∣∣
u= ∂F (x)
∂x
ν(x,p), p=F (x)
= −σ(x, F (x)) +
ν(x, F (x))T
[
∂F (x)
∂x
I
]T
Π
[
∂F (x)
∂x
I
]
ν(x, F (x)),
where we have used (9a). Then the inequality (13) implies
∂V (x)
∂x
ν(x, F (x)) ≤ −σ(x, F (x)),
where the right-hand side is nonpositive and, by (9b), vanishes
when x ∈ NE(F ). Thus V (x) = S(x, F (x)) indeed serves
as a Lyapunov function and guarantees global asymptotic
stability of NE(F ).
In the following remark we use Theorem 1 to recover key
stability results from [1]. To do so, we first note that, when
Π11 = 0, the inequality in (13) is equivalent to the following
incremental quadratic constraint:[
F (x) − F (y)
x− y
]T
Π
[
F (x)− F (y)
x− y
]
≤ 0, x, y ∈ X. (14)
Remark 5. (Recovering key results from [1]) If the n × n
block-partitions of Π are Π11 = 0, Π22 = 0 and Π12 = Π21 =
1
2I as previously considered in Remark 3, then (14) becomes
the following contraction inequality:
(F (x)− F (y))T (x− y) ≤ 0, x, y ∈ X. (15)
Hence, Remark 4 allows us to invoke Theorem 1 to recover
the portions of [1, Theorems 5.1 and 7.1] that guarantee
that NE(F ) is a globally asymptotically stable set for (12)
when the EDM is a separable EPT or IPC, provided that F
satisfies (15). In this context, it is also relevant to mention
that [6, Corollary 2] extends [1, Theorem 5.1] to the more
general class of integrable EPT EDM even when NE(F ) is
not a singleton.
Remark 6. (Characterizing δ-passivity surplus) Another
special case of Theorem 1 is when Π11 = 0, Π12 = Π21 =
1
2I ,
Π22 = −ηI , η > 0, in which case the EDM is said to have
a “surplus” of δ-passivity [6], [5]. With this choice of Π, the
condition in (14) reduces to the following inequality indicating
that a commensurate “deficit” of contraction is allowed in the
payoff model:
(F (x) − F (y))T (x − y) ≤ η‖x− y‖2, x, y ∈ X.
As shown in [3], [22, Corollary IV.3], the EPT and IPC EDM
classes do not have δ-passivity surplus when nr ≥ 3. However,
there are instances of the so-called perturbed best response3
(PBR) EDM class that have δ-passivity surplus. The analysis
of δ-passivity for the PBR EDM class was first put forth in [3],
[22], and later extended in [6]. Because this class is not Nash
stationary, the analysis of δ-dissipativity of the PBR EDM is
beyond the scope of this article.
IV. WEIGHTED CONTRACTIVE PAYOFF FOR
MULTI-POPULATION GAMES
In Remark 5, we explained how Theorem 1 recovers known
results for contractive games as special cases. To demonstrate
the broader applicability of Theorem 1, we now consider a
multi-population game in which the EDM (3) is δ-passive for
each population, and show that stability of Nash equilibria
3See [23] for a in-depth analysis of the PBR revision protocol.
5can be ascertained with a relaxed form of the contraction
property (15) for the payoff model. We start by stating the
following lemma, which assumes the EDM for each population
r is δ-dissipative w.s.r. Πr, and constructs a composite Π
with flexible weights. We state the lemma without proof, as it
follows imediately from Definition 4.
Lemma 1. Suppose that each population r ∈ {1, · · · , ρ} of an
EDM (3) possesses a storage function Sr : Xr ×Rn
r
→ R≥0
and σr : Xr × Rn
r
→ R≥0 satisfying the conditions:
∂Sr(xr , pr)
∂xr
νr(xr , pr) +
∂Sr(xr , pr)
∂pr
ur ≤ −σr(xr , pr)
+
[
ur
νr(xr , pr)
]T [
Πr11 Π
r
12
Πr21 Π
r
22
] [
ur
νr(xr , pr)
]
, (16a)
Sr(xr , pr) = 0 ⇔ νr(xr, pr) = 0, (16b)
σr(xr , pr) = 0 ⇔ νr(xr, pr) = 0 (16c)
for all xr ∈ Xr, pr ∈ Rn
r
, and ur ∈ Rn
r
. Then, for any given
choice of positive weights w1, . . . , wρ, the composite storage
function
S(x, p) =
ρ∑
r=1
wrSr(xr, pr)
for the multi-population EDM (4) satisfies (9a) with
Π=


w1Π111 w
1Π112
. . .
. . .
wρΠρ11 w
ρΠρ12
w1Π121 w
1Π122
. . .
. . .
wρΠρ21 w
ρΠρ22


. (17)
In particular, if the EDM for each population is δ-passive
(Πr11 = Π
r
22 = 0, Π
r
12 = Π
r
21 =
1
2I), then the multi-population
EDM (4) satisfies (9a) with
Π11 = Π22 = 0, Π12 = Π21 =
1
2
W (18a)
W :=


w1In1
. . .
wρInρ

 . (18b)
Remark 7. (Lemma 1 applies to IPC EDM) Using the same
analysis as Remark 4, we infer that S IPC,r and σIPC,r for the IPC
EDM class, as given in (11), satisfy (16) with Πr11 = Π
r
22 = 0,
Πr12 = Π
r
21 =
1
2Inr . Therefore the conclusion of Lemma 1
holds with (18) for this class.
The following corollary to Lemma 1 shows that we can
leverage the flexible weights w1, . . . , wρ to relax condition
(13) of Theorem 1. In particular, when the EDM for each
population is δ-passive, we can establish global asymptotic
stability for the Nash equilibrium set when the payoff is not
necessarily contractive, but becomes so upon an appropriate
choice of weights.
Corollary 1. (Weighted contraction) Under the hypotheses
of Lemma 1, NE(F ) is a globally asymptotically stable equi-
librium set of (12) if there exist positive weights w1, . . . , wρ
with which (17) satisfies (13). In particular, when the EDM
for each population is δ-dissipative with Πr11 = Π
r
22 = 0,
Πr12 = Π
r
21 =
1
2Inr , global asymptotic stability follows if the
following holds:
W
∂F (x)
∂x
+
∂F (x)
∂x
T
W ≤ 0, x ∈ X (19)
for some W > 0 of the form (18b) or, equivalently,
(WF (x)−WF (y))T (x− y) ≤ 0, x, y ∈ X. (20)
A. Example: Congestion Game with Mixed Autonomy
As an illustration of weighted contractive games consider a
road network, described as a directed graph where each link is
a road segment connecting two distinct nodes. Suppose there
are γ ≥ 1 origin-destination (OD) node pairs and, for each
pair r = 1, . . . , γ, there exist nr ≥ 1 routes that traverse no
link twice and connect the origin to the destination.
Following [7], [8] we consider two types of vehicles -
autonomous and regular - for each OD pair, resulting in ρ = 2γ
populations. We denote by xr, r = 1, · · · , γ, the flow vector
of autonomous vehicles with OD pair r, and by xγ+r the flow
vector of regular vehicles with OD pair r = 1, · · · , γ. We
further define
x
aut :=


x1
...
xγ

 , xreg :=


xγ+1
...
x2γ

 , x =
[
x
aut
x
reg
]
. (21)
Since the constituent vectors xr and xγ+r each has nr entries,
x
aut and xreg have N := n1 + · · ·+ nγ entries, one for each
route.
Next we define the N × L routing matrix
Riℓ =
{
1 if route i traverses link ℓ
0 otherwise
and note that zaut := RTxaut and zreg := RTxreg are L-
vectors of link flows, the former due to autonomous vehicles
and the latter due to regular vehicles. As in [8] we assume the
delay on link ℓ is an increasing function Φℓ of the “effective
flow”
zℓ := µz
aut
ℓ + z
reg
ℓ ,
where the factor µ ∈ (0, 1) accounts for the capacity increase
of the link due to the shorter headway maintained by au-
tonomous vehicles. We may then define a cost function for
vehicles using route i (autonomous or regular) as the sum
of the delays incurred on each link traversed by route i, and
assign the negative of the cost function as the payoff:
Fi(x) = Fi+N (x) = −
L∑
ℓ=1
RiℓΦℓ(zℓ), i = 1, . . . , N. (22)
Then the full payoff vector is
p = F (x) = −
[
R
R
]
Φ1(z1)
...
ΦL(zL)

 (23)
6where
z = µRTxaut +RTxreg =
[
R
R
]T [
µI 0
0 I
]
x (24)
and, thus,
∂F (x)
∂x
=−
[
R
R
]
Φ′1(z1)
. . .
Φ′L(zL)


[
R
R
]T[
µI 0
0 I
]
.
(25)
Note that [
µI 0
0 I
]
∂F (x)
∂x
is symmetric and negative semidefinite, as each Φℓ is
an increasing function implying that the diagonal entries
Φ′1, . . . ,Φ
′
L are nonnegative. Therefore, (19) holds with
W =
[
µI 0
0 I
]
, (26)
and we conclude from Corollary 1 that, if the EDM for
each r = 1, · · · , 2γ is δ-dissipative with Πr11 = Π
r
22 = 0,
Πr12 = Π
r
21 =
1
2Inr , then the set of Nash equilibria is globally
asymptotically stable. Hence, in light of the Remark 7 and
Corollary 1, we can state without proof the following corollary
characterizing the stability of NE(F ) for Example IV-A when
the EDM is of the IPC class.
Corollary 2. If F is as given in (22), and the EDM is of the
IPC class, such as the Smith EDM, then NE(F ) is a globally
asymptotically equilibrium set of (12).
V. CONSTANT MATRIX PARAMETERIZATIONS OF THE
PAYOFF JACOBIAN
In applications it may be difficult to verify that condition
(13) of Theorem 1 holds for all x ∈ X. To overcome this
difficulty we propose bounding the Jacobian matrix
J(x) :=
∂F (x)
∂x
within a set parameterized by constant matrices. Such param-
eterizations include the convex hull:
conv{A1, . . . , Ak} := {λ1A1 + · · ·+ λkAk : (27)
λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , k, λ1 + · · ·+ λk = 1} ,
and the conic hull:
cone{B1, . . . , Bs} := {θ1B1 + · · ·+ θsBs : (28)
θi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , s} .
If J(x) lies in one of these sets or their sum for all x ∈
X, then we can ascertain condition (13) by checking matrix
inequalities involving only the constant matrices A1, . . . , Ak,
B1, . . . , Bs.
Proposition 1. Let Π11 = 0. Then either of the following
conditions guarantees (13):
i) J(x) ∈ conv{A1, . . . , Ak} for all x ∈ X, and[
Ai
I
]T
Π
[
Ai
I
]
≤ 0 i = 1, · · · , k. (29)
ii) J(x) ∈ cone{B1, . . . , Bs} for all x ∈ X, Π22 ≤ 0, and
ΠT12Bi +B
T
i Π12 ≤ 0 i = 1, · · · , s. (30)
iii) J(x) ∈ conv{A1, . . . , Ak} + cone{B1, . . . , Bs} for all
x ∈ X, and (29) and (30) hold. ✷
As an illustration, the Jacobian (25) in Example IV-A can
be rewritten as
J(x) =
L∑
ℓ=1
Φ′ℓ(zℓ)Bℓ,
where
Bℓ =
[
Rℓ
Rℓ
] [
µRTℓ R
T
ℓ
]
and Rℓ denotes the ℓth column of the routing matrix R.
Since Φ′ℓ(zℓ) ≥ 0 for each ℓ, we conclude that J(x) ∈
cone{B1, . . . , BL}, and (30) holds with Π12 = W specified
in (26).
Recall that, in Section IV, we considered multi-population
games where the EDM for each population satisfies a δ-
dissipativity property, leading to the form of Π in (17) with
flexible weights wr > 0, r = 1, · · · , ρ. Since Π depends
linearly on these weights, conditions (29)-(30) become linear
matrix inequalities (LMIs) with decision variables wr > 0,
r = 1, · · · , ρ. Thus, we can search for weights satisfying (13)
numerically with convex programming software, such as CVX
[24].
In several applications the Jacobian belongs to a convex set
of the form:
box{G0, G1, . . . , Gd} := {G0 + γ1G1 + · · ·+ γdGd :
γi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, . . . , d} . (31)
Although we can apply Proposition 1 to the matrices that form
the vertices of this set, this application involves k = 2d vertices
and may become intractable for large d. We next propose an
alternative test to check (13) that involves only d+1 matrices,
G0, G1, . . . , Gd:
Proposition 2. Let Π11 = 0 and suppose J(x) ∈
box{G0, G1, . . . , Gd} where
Gi = CiD
T
i , i = 1, . . . , d, (32)
with Ci, Di ∈ R
n×̺i , ̺i denoting the rank of Gi. Then (13)
holds if there exist constants ω1, · · · , ωd > 0 s.t.[
ΠT12G0 +G
T
0 Π12 +Π22 Π
T
12C +DΩ
CTΠ12 + ΩD
T −2Ω
]
≤ 0, (33)
where C :=
[
C1 · · ·Cd
]
, D :=
[
D1 · · ·Dd
]
, and
Ω :=


ω1I̺1
. . .
ωdI̺d

 . (34)
Note that (33) is linear in Ω and Π. Thus, the search
for nonnegative constants ω1, · · · , ωd in (34) to satisfy (33)
can be performed numerically with LMI solvers. This search
can also be combined with a simultaneous search for the
weights w1, · · · , wρ when Π has the form (17) arising in
multi-population games.
7A. Example: Bypassing Near a Road Split
Consider two populations of vehicles approaching a split,
where population 1 is headed towards the first branch and
population 2 towards the second. Following [21] we consider
two strategies for each population: steadfast behavior where
the vehicle stays on the lane destined to the branch, and
bypassing behavior where the vehicle uses the other lane and
merges with the correct lane before the split (see figure below).
x1s
x1b
x2s
x2b
Let x = [x1s x
1
b x
2
s x
2
b ]
T where xis and x
i
b are the flows of
steadfast and bypassing vehicles headed to branch i = 1, 2,
and assume they are normalized by the total flow. That is,
xis + x
i
b = m
i, i = 1, 2, and m1 +m2 = 1. Reference [21]
proposes the payoff
F (x) = −


ct1(x
1
s + x
2
b) + c
c
1x
1
b(x
1
s + x
2
b)
ct2(x
2
s + ϑ1x
1
b) + c
c
2x
2
b(x
2
s + x
1
b)
ct2(x
2
s + x
1
b) + c
c
2x
2
b(x
2
s + x
1
b)
ct1(x
1
s + ϑ2x
2
b) + c
c
1x
1
b(x
1
s + x
2
b)

 (35)
where cti > 0, c
s
i > 0, and ϑi > 1. Here x
1
s+x
2
b is the fraction
of the total flow using the lane destined to branch 1 and
ct1(x
1
s + x
2
b) is the cost of traversing this lane. For bypassing
vehicles the traversal cost is modified as ct1(x
1
s+ϑ2x
2
b), where
ϑ2 > 1 accounts for the additional distance traveled. The other
term, cc1x
1
b(x
1
s + x
2
b), appearing in the first and fourth entries
of F is the cost of crossing effects due to bypassing vehicles
x1b merging to the lane for branch 1.
Recall xis and x
i
b, i = 1, 2, are normalized by the total flow,
and define γ1 = x
1
s, γ2 = x
1
b , γ3 = x
2
s, γ4 = x
2
b so that γi ∈
[0, 1], i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Let e1, e2, e3, e4 denote the unit vectors in
R
4. Then, the Jacobian of (35) can be written as in (31)-(32)
with d = 4, C1 = −(e1 + e4), C2 = −
[
e1 + e4 e2 + e3
]
,
C3 = −(e2 + e3), C4 = −
[
e1 + e4 e2 + e3
]
, D1 =
cc1e2, D2 =
[
cc1(e1 + e4) c
c
2e4
]
, D3 = c
c
2e4, D4 =[
cc1e2 c
c
2(e2 + e3)
]
,
G0 = −


ct1 0 0 c
t
1
0 ct2ϑ1 c
t
2 0
0 ct2 c
t
2 0
ct1 0 0 c
t
1ϑ2

 .
For the values ct1 = c
t
2 = c
c
1 = c
c
2 = 1, ϑ1 = ϑ2 = 2.7
obtained from data in [21], we ascertained using CVX [24] that
the LMI (33) is feasible for Π12 =
1
2I , Π22 = 0. Therefore,
the payoff (35) is contractive. Stability of Nash equilibria can
then be established from the δ-passivity of the EDM as in
Theorem 1 and the ensuing discussion, complementing the
static analysis in [21] for the existence and uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium.
VI. DYNAMICAL MODELS FOR PAYOFF
We next consider the situation where, instead of the static
model p = F (x), the payoff evolves according to a dynamical
model of the form
q˙(t) = f
(
q(t), x(t)
)
(36a)
p(t) = h
(
q(t), x(t)
)
, (36b)
where q(t) ∈ Ro, while f : Ro × X→ Ro and
h : Ro × X→ Rn are Lipschitz continuous maps.
Definition 5. (PDM) Following [6, Definition 4] we refer to
(36) as the Payoff Dynamics Model (PDM), and assume that
it recovers the static model p = F (x) in steady-state, that is,
f(q, x) = 0 ⇒ h(q, x) = F (x). (37)
We now generalize Theorem 1 to the case where a PDM
governs the payoff. This generalization will allow us to char-
acterize the stability of NE(F ) for the following closed loop
model obtained by interconnecting the EDM (4) in feedback
with (36):
x˙(t) = ν
(
x(t), h
(
q(t), x(t)
))
, (38a)
q˙(t) = f
(
q(t), x(t)
)
, t ≥ 0. (38b)
Theorem 2. Suppose that a Nash stationary EDM (4), a
PDM (36) satisfying (37), and Π = ΠT in Rn×n are given.
Under these conditions, the set of rest points of (38) is the
set of Nash equilibria NE(F ). Moreover, this set is globally
asymptotically stable for (38) if the EDM is δ-dissipative w.s.r.
Π and the PDM has a storage function Q : Ro×X→ R≥0 and
a nonnegative map ς : Ro×X→ R≥0 such that the following
holds for all q ∈ Ro, x ∈ X, and ζ ∈ Rn:
∂Q(q, x)
∂q
f(q, x) +
∂Q(q, x)
∂x
ζ ≤ −ς(q, x)− ψTΠψ (39a)
Q(q, x) = 0 ⇔ f(q, x) = 0 (39b)
ς(q, x) = 0 ⇔ f(q, x) = 0, (39c)
where ψ is defined as:
ψ :=
[
∂h(q,x)
∂q
f(q, x) + ∂h(q,x)
∂x
ζ
ζ
]
. (40)
Before we give a proof, in the following remark we
compare (39) with the related concept of δ-antipassivity,
as defined in [5, Definition 12], and also discussed in [6,
Section VI.B)]. δ-antipassivity was originally defined in [4]
as the “antisymmetric” of δ-passivity without the additional
condition [5, (54a)], which is needed to ascertain the stability
of NE(F ) in the context of [5], [6].
Remark 8. (When (39) implies δ-antipassivity) Suppose Π
is chosen as in Remark 3, where the n×n block-partitions of Π
are Π11 = 0, Π22 = 0 and Π12 = Π12 =
1
2I . For this choice
of Π, if (39) holds for valid Q and ς then, by choosing ζ = x˙,
we conclude that the PDM is δ-antipassive according to [5,
Definition 12]. In particular, (39a) implies [5, (54b)], while
(39b) and (37) imply [5, (54a)]. Note that the opposite may
not hold unless one can show the existence of an appropriate
ς satisfying (39a) and (39c).
8We proceed now with a proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. The rest points are the solutions of the simultaneous
equations ν(x, p) = 0, f(q, x) = 0 and p = h(q, x). Since
the latter two imply p = F (x) by (37), we conclude similarly
to the static payoff case in Section II that Nash stationarity
property (7) of the EDM ensures that the rest points are Nash
equilibria. To prove global asymptotic stability, we use the
Lyapunov function
V (x, q) = S(x, h(q, x)) +Q(q, x),
which is nonnegative definite and, from (39b) and (9c), van-
ishes on NE(F ). Note that
∂V (x, q)
∂x
=
∂Q(q, x)
∂x
+
∂S(x, p)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
p=h(q,x)
+
∂S(x, p)
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=h(q,x)
∂h(q, x)
∂x
∂V (x, q)
∂q
=
∂S(x, p)
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=h(q,x)
∂h(q, x)
∂q
+
∂Q(q, x)
∂q
.
Then, we write
∂V (x, q)
∂x
ν(x, h(q, x)) +
∂V (x, q)
∂q
f(q, x)
= Θ1(x, q) + Θ2(q, x) (41)
where
Θ1(q, x) :=
∂Q(q, x)
∂q
f(q, x) +
∂Q(q, x)
∂x
ν(x, h(q, x))
Θ2(q, x) :=
∂S(x, p)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
p=h(q,x)
ν(x, h(q, x))
+
∂S(x, p)
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=h(q,x)
∂h(q, x)
∂x
ν(x, h(q, x))
+
∂S(x, p)
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=h(q,x)
∂h(q, x)
∂q
f(q, x).
Next we note from (39a) and (9a) that
Θ1(q, x) ≤ −ς(q, x)−
[
u
ζ
]T
Π
[
u
ζ
]
Θ2(q, x) ≤ −σ(x, h(q, x)) +
[
u
ζ
]T
Π
[
u
ζ
]
where ζ := ν(x, h(q, x)) and u := ∂h(q,x)
∂x
ζ + ∂h(q,x)
∂q
f(q, x).
Substituting in (41), we get
∂V (x, q)
∂x
ν(x, h(q, x)) +
∂V (x, q)
∂q
f(q, x)
≤ −ς(q, x)− σ(x, h(q, x)), (42)
where the right-hand side is negative semidefinite and, from
(39c) and (9b), vanishes on NE(F ). Thus, we conclude global
asymptotic stability of NE(F ).
A. Example: Congestion Game with Mixed Autonomy and
Smoothing Dynamics
We proceed to analyze the following dynamical version
of Example IV-A in which the payoff responds to changes
in F
(
x(t)
)
according to a first-order system that, as argued
in [4] for a similar example, smooths short-term fluctuations
and isolates longer term trends. The smoothing dynamics can
account for, e.g., the time lag with which the drivers receive
and process congestion information.
Definition 6. (Congestion Game with Mixed Autonomy and
Smoothing Dynamics) Given the link delay functions Φℓ,
ℓ = 1, . . . , L, and the routing matrix R in Example IV-A, and
a positive time constant τ , the PDM to be analyzed here is:
τ q˙(t) = −q(t) +


Φ1(z1(t))
...
ΦL(zL(t))

 (43a)
p(t) = −
[
R
R
]
q(t), (43b)
where z is as defined in (24), q(t) ∈ RL, and p(t) ∈ R2N .
Note that (43), with steady-state condition q˙(t) = 0, recovers
(23); that is, (37) holds.
Assumption 1. (Delay monotonicity) Recall that the function
Φℓ in Example IV-A represents the delay on link ℓ as a function
of the effective flow zℓ ≥ 0. We assume that this function is
strictly increasing, continuously differentiable, and surjective
with codomain [αℓ,∞). Since Φℓ(zℓ) is in [αℓ,∞), the set
[α1,∞)×· · ·× [αL,∞) is forward invariant for q(t) in (43a).
When Φℓ satisfies Assumption 1, we let φ1, · · · , φL be
functions such that φ′ℓ(zℓ) = Φℓ(zℓ) and define
φ(z) := φ1(z1) + · · ·+ φL(zL),
which is strictly convex since Φℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , L, are
strictly increasing functions. It follows that ∇φ(z) =[
Φ1(z1) · · · ΦL(zL)
]T
and (43a) can be rewritten as
τ q˙(t) = −q(t) +∇φ(z(t))
or, equivalently, as in (36a) with
f(q, x) =
1
τ
(−q +∇φ(z))
∣∣∣∣
z=[µRT RT ]x
. (44)
1) Storage function based on Legendre’s transform: To
ascertain the stability of (12) when F is contractive and
the revision protocol of the EDM is of the perturbed best
response (PBR) type, [23, Theorem 3.1] constructed a Lya-
punov function that makes use of Legendre’s transform. In [6,
Section IX.B], this idea was adapted to construct a storage
function for a smoothing PDM based on a potential game F ,
subject to additional constraints on the image of F . While the
Lyapunov function in [23, Theorem 3.1] involved the Legendre
transform of the so-called deterministic perturbation, the stor-
age function in [6, Section IX.B] incorporates the Legendre
transform of the potential of F . Subject to Assumption 1 and
9motivated by the latter approach, we propose the following
candidate storage function for the PDM (43):
Q(q, x) :=
1
τ
(φ(z)− qT z − φ∗(q))
∣∣∣∣
z=[µRT RT ]x
(45)
with q ∈ [α1,∞)× · · · × [αL,∞) and x ∈ R
2N
≥0 . Here, φ
∗ is
the Legendre transform of φ, defined as
φ∗(q) := min
y∈RL
≥0
{φ(y)− qT y}. (46)
Note that φ∗(q) is well-defined for q ∈ [α1,∞)×· · ·×[αL,∞),
since the minimization in (46) decomposes into
min
yℓ≥0
φℓ(yℓ)− qℓyℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , L,
which has unique solution φ′ℓ(yℓ) = Φℓ(yℓ) = qℓ when qℓ ∈
[αℓ,∞) by surjectivity of Φℓ.
Remark 9. (F is not a potential game) The approach in [6,
Section IX.B] applies only to potential games [25], [26].
However, F in Example IV-A is not a potential game, since
its Jacobian is asymmetric. We circumvent this difficulty by
working with the Legendre transform of φ.
The following proposition guarantees that this choice for
Q satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 for Π as chosen in
Lemma 1, andW is as in (26). In contrast to [6, Proposition 9],
no other requirements, other than Assumption 1, need to be
imposed on the image of F . In addition, our proof for the
proposition guarantees the existence of an associated ζ for
which (39b),(39a),(39c) hold.
Proposition 3. If Assumption 1 holds then Q, as de-
fined in (45) for the PDM (43), satisfies the hypotheses
(39b),(39a),(39c) of Theorem 2 with
Π11 = Π22 = 0 and Π12 = Π21 =
1
2
W, (47)
where W is as in (26).
Proof. It follows from (45)-(46) that Q(q, x) ≥ 0, and it
vanishes when z = [µRT RT ]x is the minimizer in (46),
that is when ∇φ(z) = q. Since this is the same condition for
f(q, x) in (44) to vanish, we conclude that (39b) holds. Next
note that
∂Q(q, x)
∂x
ζ =
1
τ
(−q +∇φ(z))T
[
µRT RT
]
ζ (48a)
= f(q, x)T
[
µRT RT
]
ζ (48b)
= −ψTΠψ. (48c)
Here (48c) follows because, from (40) and h(q, x) = −
[
R
R
]
q
we have
ψT =
[
−f(q, x)TRT −f(q, x)TRT ζT
]
and, with Π as defined in (47) and (26), we get
−ψTΠψ =
[
f(q, x)TRT f(q, x)TRT
] [µI 0
0 I
]
ζ,
which is equal to (48b). Thus, (39a) follows from (48) with
ς(q, x) := −
∂Q(q, x)
∂q
f(q, x). (49)
To show (39c) we note that
∂Q(q, x)
∂q
= −
1
τ
(∇φ∗(q) + z)
T
(50)
and, from (44) and (49),
ς(q, x) =
1
τ2
(∇φ∗(q) + z)T (−q +∇φ(z)). (51)
We define the new variable z¯ = −∇φ∗(q), which satisfies the
inverse relation4 q = ∇φ(z¯) and rewrite (51) as
ς(q, x) =
1
τ2
(z − z¯)
T
(∇φ(z)−∇φ(z¯)). (52)
Since φ is strictly convex, the expression in (52) is nonnegative
and vanishes only when z = z¯, that is only when ∇φ(z) =
∇φ(z¯) = q. This is the same condition for f(q, x) in (44) to
vanish, thus (39c) follows.
This proposition allows us to use Theorem 2 to conclude
global asymptotic stability of NE(F ) for (38) when the EDM
satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1 and the PDM is specified
by (43), subject to Assumption 1. In particular, we can use
Remark 7 to state without proof the following counterpart of
Corollary 2:
Corollary 3. If the PDM (43) satisfies Assumption 1, and the
EDM is of the IPC class, such as the Smith EDM, thenNE(F )
is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium set of (38).
Thus, the stability conclusion in Corollary 2 holds mutatis
mutandis despite the addition of dynamics to the payoff model.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented dissipativity tools to establish global asymp-
totic stability of the set of Nash equilibria in a deterministic
model of population games. This model allows for a dynamic
payoff mechanism as well as broad classes of protocols by
which the agents revise their strategies. Our results generalized
those in [1] that use contraction properties of the payoff, and
those in [4], [3], [5], [6] that relate contraction to passivity
properties and account for dynamical payoff mechanisms.
We defined the notion of δ-dissipativity for the evolutionary
dynamics model and showed in Theorems 1 and 2 that a com-
plementary property of the payoff dynamics model guarantees
stability for the set of Nash equilibria. This complementary
property relaxed the contraction property of the payoff used in
earlier results and allowed us to define a class of weighted con-
traction games, which encompasses a routing game example
with mixed autonomy. We also presented a numerical method
that uses convex optimization to check the aforementioned
relaxed contraction properties. We hope that the results of this
paper will enable researchers to study broader classes of payoff
dynamics arising in applications.
4To see this, let z¯ be the minimizer in (46), that is∇φ(z¯) = q and φ∗(q) =
φ(z¯) − qT z¯. Then φ(z¯) − qˆT z¯ ≥ φ∗(qˆ), with equality when qˆ = q. Thus,
φ(z¯) = maxqˆ φ
∗(qˆ) + qˆT z¯ and qˆ = q is the maximizer: ∇φ∗(q) = −z¯.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Since J(x) ∈ box{G0, C1D
T
1 , . . . , CdD
T
d } and Π11 = 0
we will prove (13) by showing that
ΠT12(G0 + γ1C1D
T
1 + · · ·+ γdCdD
T
d ) + (53)
(GT0 + γ1D1C
T
1 + · · ·+ γdDdC
T
d )Π12 +Π22 ≤ 0
for all γi ∈ [0, 1]. Inequality (53) means that, for all x ∈ R
n,
xT (ΠT12G0 +G
T
0 Π12 +Π22)x (54)
+xTΠT12(C1y1 + · · ·+ Cdyd)
+(C1y1 + · · ·+ Cdyd)
TΠ12x ≤ 0,
where we have substituted yi := γiD
T
i x. Since γi ∈ [0, 1], we
have
yTi D
T
i x ≥ y
T
i yi i = 1, . . . , d. (55)
Thus, we wish to show that (54), rewritten here as

x
y1
...
yd


T [
ΠT12G0 +G
T
0 Π12 +Π22 Π
T
12C
CTΠ12 0
]
x
y1
...
yd

 ≤ 0, (56)
holds when the variables x, y1, · · · , yd are constrained by (55)
or, equivalently,

x
y1
...
yd


T [
0 DiEi
ETi D
T
i −2E
T
i Ei
]
x
y1
...
yd

 ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . , d, (57)
where Ei is the ̺i × (̺1 + · · ·+ ̺d) matrix such that

E1
...
Ed

 = I̺1+···+̺d , therefore Ei


y1
...
yd

 = yi.
It follows from the S-procedure [27] that if there exist non-
negative constants ω1, · · · , ωd such that[
ΠT12G0 +G
T
0 Π12 +Π22 Π
T
12C
CTΠ12 0
]
+
d∑
i=1
ωi
[
0 DiEi
ETi D
T
i −2E
T
i Ei
]
≤ 0 (58)
then (56) holds whenever (57) does. Indeed (58) can be
rewritten as (33), and the existence of nonnegative constants
ω1, · · · , ωd is the hypothesis of the Proposition. Thus, (56)
holds whenever (57) does, we conclude (53) and, hence, (13).
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